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1. Introduction 
 
A common problem faced by many firms around the world is the scarce availability of long-
term sources of funds. Exclusive reliance on short-term borrowing may expose companies to 
illiquidity risks and reduce their overall growth potential. To address these issues, many 
countries have embarked on policies promoting the development of long-term loan or bond 
markets with mixed results. However, while the negative implications of excessive short-term 
borrowing on growth and stability are well known (eg. Chang and Velasco, 2001 and 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998), there is no consensus on its underlying determinants 
and hence the main priorities for reform. 
Under various assumptions, the decision to borrow at short-term maturities has been 
modelled in the corporate finance literature as a solution to debt-related agency problems 
(Barnea, Haugen and Senbet, 1980), or justified as a disciplinary tool to limit moral hazard 
(Rey and Stiglitz, 1993), as the result of coordination failures among banks (Dewatripont and 
Maskin, 1995), driven by the fear of early project termination by uninformed investors (Von 
Thadden, 1995), or as the consequence of illiquidity problems and inadequate regulation and 
institutions (Diamond and Rajan, 2000). In a signalling framework under asymmetric 
information, firms with favorable insider information may distinguish their quality by issuing 
short-term debt and roll it over, provided issuing costs are sufficiently high (Flannery, 1986, 
and Diamond, 1991).  
This paper asks the question whether short-term lending is preferred by banks in credit 
markets where information about borrowers is relatively more opaque and there is a higher 
dispersion in the credit qualities of obligors. Most models in corporate finance analyze the 
choice of debt maturity from the perspective of the borrower, which chooses its debt maturity 
structure and optimizes from a variety of capital sources available in a developed country 
paradigm. Bearing in mind the credit constraints faced by firms in developing countries, this 
paper focuses on optimal debt maturity choice from the perspective of the lender. We look 
into the conditions under which banks would lend short or long term under imperfect 
information about heterogeneous borrowers. The value of short-term lending as a hedge 
against uncertainty is analyzed in a dynamic model both under incomplete but symmetric 
information and with asymmetric information.  As a complement to the hidden-action model 
by Rey and Stiglitz (1993) in “Short-term contracts as a monitoring device”, the hidden-  2
information framework proposed in this paper emphasizes the benefits of short-term contracts 
as a screening device in high-risk credit markets. Building on Von Thadden (1995), we do 
not assume that monitoring is perfect and the lender learns the firm’s credit quality with 
certainty. Our paper models information acquisition as a screening process, through repeated 
short-term lending relationships, which may be more or less effective depending on the level 
of uncertainty in the micro-, macroeconomic as well as institutional environment. 
The results of the model are then tested on empirical data of both developed economies and 
developing countries around the world. Although most existing empirical studies on 
corporate debt maturity focus on individual countries (mainly the US), there is a growing 
literature on how institutional differences across countries influence maturity choices (see, 
Dermirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999, Giannetti, 2003, and Fan, Titman and Twite, 2006). 
All of the above papers mainly focus on legal institutions of countries. A recent study by 
Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2006) analyzes the benefits of credit bureaus for the growth 
of private credit. Our study contributes to this line of research by investigating the impact of 
institutions aiming at reducing credit information asymmetries on the structure of corporate 
debt maturity. In particular, we focus on public and private credit bureaus and accounting 
standards as determinants of debt maturity structure after controlling for the impact of legal 
institutions, financial development and other macro and micro factors. 
The main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows.  
From a theoretical standpoint, unlike in Hart and Tirole (1988), we find that it is possible for 
lenders to separate in equilibrium borrowers of different risk levels, under the assumption that 
higher-risk borrowers are more myopic, i.e. have higher time discount factors. In this case, 
repeated short-term contracting becomes an important mechanism for lenders to “learn” 
about the credit quality of borrowers. Our model shows that a high degree of information 
asymmetries in credit markets makes short-term lending the choice preferred by banks in 
equilibrium, although it may not be the socially optimal outcome.    
In the empirical part of the paper, we assemble a novel cross-country database to test the 
main predictions arising from the model. Our main finding is that better credit information 
(as proxied by the existence and coverage of private and public credit registries as well as by 
improvements in accounting standards) is associated with a higher share of long-term debt as 
a proportion of total corporate debt in both developed and developing countries. We also find 
that countries with more uncertain legal frameworks are characterized by higher short-term   3
debt. This suggests that short-term lending may be a valuable hedge against uncertainty from 
the lender’s perspective. Furthermore, countries with a lower dispersion of firms’ default 
probabilities are characterized by a higher ratio of short-term to total corporate debt. This is 
consistent with our theory of short-term lending being used by banks as a screening device 
when differences in default risks among firms are more opaque. Overall, our findings suggest 
that promoting institutions and policies to improve the quality of credit information around 
the world is an important prerequisite for increasing access of firms to long-term finance.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the determinants of the 
optimal choice of debt maturity. Section 3 presents a two-period stylized model of a bank 
choosing loan maturity under incomplete but symmetric information between lender and 
borrower. Section 4 extends the analysis to a more general dynamic set-up with asymmetric 
information between lender and borrower, and discusses our main testable hypothesis. 
Section 5 introduces the data and empirical results, and Section 6 concludes and draws some 
policy implications. 
 
2. The literature on debt maturity structure 
 
Since Stiglitz (1974) extended Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) contribution to formally 
establish debt maturity irrelevance in perfect markets, the literature in corporate finance on 
debt maturity choices has identified a variety of imperfections in capital markets that can 
explain why the choice of maturity in fact matters.
1  
A number of theoretical studies explain why risky firms with long-term projects might 
borrow on a short-term basis in the presence of asymmetric information. Using a signalling 
framework, Flannery (1986) shows that firms with favorable insider information may 
distinguish their quality by issuing short-term debt and roll it over, provided issuing costs are 
sufficiently high. The model predicts that debt maturity is shorter when there are more 
information asymmetries and less risk. By incorporating liquidity risk into a framework 
similar to that in Flannery’s model, Diamond (1991) shows that debt maturity is a non-
monotonic function of risk ratings: the shortest maturity for both the lowest and highest risk 
ratings. Rajan (1992) analyzes how information asymmetries and bargaining power affect the 
                                                      
1 For instance, theories of debt maturity have focused on the role of agency costs (see, Myers, 1977, and Barnea, 
Haugen and Senbet, 1980), tax (see, Brick and Ravid, 1985, and Lewis, 1990), and coordination failures among 
banks (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995). Ravid (1996) provides a comprehensive survey.   4
choice between short- and long-term debts from arm’s length lenders, and Diamond (1993) 
links the choice of maturity with the choice of seniority of debt contracts under asymmetric 
information. Using a hidden-action model, Rey and Stiglitz (1993) have further demonstrated 
the disciplinary role of short-term lending to resolve moral hazard problems. They show that 
short-term lenders have desirable incentives to exert control and invest in monitoring, and the 
possibility of not rolling over loans is an effective threat over firms. Furthermore, Von 
Thadden (1995) argues that monitoring by lenders helps overcome the short-term bias of 
corporate investment under asymmetric information.
 2  
In this paper, the choice of debt maturity is analyzed from the perspective of the lender and 
not from that of the borrower as common in the literature (see, e.g., Flannery, 1986). This is 
especially applicable to developing countries where the bargaining power in deciding 
maturity choice is more likely to be on the side of the banks than the firms which are credit 
constrained. As a complement to the hidden action model by Rey and Stiglitz (1993), the 
hidden-information framework proposed in this paper emphasizes the benefits of short-term 
contracts as a screening device in high-risk credit markets. Building on Von Thadden (1995), 
we do not assume that monitoring is perfect and the lender learns the firm’s credit quality 
with certainty. Our paper models information acquisition as a screening process, through 
repeated short-term lending relationships, which may be more or less effective depending on 
the level of uncertainty in the micro-, macroeconomic as well as institutional environment.  
A number of empirical studies have focused on the impact of information asymmetries on the 
choice of debt maturity by firms within individual countries,
3 or across countries.
4 Using 
loan-level data for the US, Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame and Miller (2005) investigate the 
importance of information asymmetries and credit risk ratings for loan maturity choices. 
They find that information asymmetries reduce loan maturities and, consistent with Diamond 
(1991), the relationship between debt maturity and risk ratings is found to be stronger when 
                                                      
2 While earlier models have been primarily concerned with financing choices in closed economies, recent 
financial turmoil in emerging markets has stimulated research into the linkages between debt maturity, the term 
structure of interest rates and the possibility of self-fulfilling currency and banking crises (see, e.g., Kaminsky 
and Reinhart, 1999, Demirguc-Kunt and Detrgiache, 1998). Short-term debt has often been criticized as a source 
of financial instability. On the one hand, a number of theoretical studies show that the accumulation of short-
term external debt is important in the generation of self-fulfilling financial crises (see Chang and Velasco, 2001, 
Rodrik and Velasco, 1999). On the other hand, Diamond and Rajan (2000) argue that the build-up of short-term 
debt in emerging markets is the consequence of the illiquidity and poor quality of investments in countries 
lacking adequate regulation and institutions. Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2002) find empirical evidence 
supporting this theory.   
3 See, Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame and Miller (2006) and Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2006), Barclay and Smith 
(1995), Guedes and Opler (1996) and Stoh and Mauer (1996) for the US studies. 
4 See, Dermirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), Giannetti (2003), Fan, Titman and Twite (2006), and 
Schmukler and Vesperoni (2006).   5
information asymmetries are higher. Recent studies show that institutions aiming at reducing 
information asymmetries (such as public and private credit registries) foster the development 
of private credit markets (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002 and Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 
2006), increase access to credit (Barron and Staten, 2003) and firm performance (Kallberg 
and Udell, 2003) and reduce non-performing loans and the costs of firm financing (Brown, 
Jappelli and Pagano, 2006). Galindo and Miller (2001) find that, in countries with more 
developed credit bureaus, firms face less severe financial constraints. This applies to large 
firms listed on the stock market as well as for small and medium-size companies.  
This paper contributes to the empirical literature by investigating the impact of institutions 
aiming at reducing credit information asymmetries on the structure of corporate debt 
maturity. In particular, we focus on public and private credit bureaus and accounting 
standards as determinants of debt maturity structure after controlling for the impact of the 
legal framework, financial development and other macro and micro factors.  
3.  Short-term lending as a hedge against uncertainty 
In order to understand how uncertainty about borrowers’ credit quality may affect optimal 
debt maturity structure, we begin in this section with a two-period model of a bank choosing 
loan maturity under incomplete but symmetric information. This stylized framework will then 
be generalized in Section 4 to a multi-period case with asymmetric information. 
The intuition of the model in this section can be briefly summarized as follows. A bank with 
incomplete information about borrowers’ credit quality compares two lending options: (i) 
committing to a non-renegotiable long-term contract versus (ii) retaining the flexibility of 
rolling over renegotiable short-term contracts. The latter option carries higher transaction 
costs but entails the possibility to exit the investment, thus limiting losses, should the 
borrower default in the first period. Intuitively, the more the uncertainty, the higher will be in 
equilibrium the bank’s preference for renegotiable short-term contracts. From the lender’s 
perspective, short-term lending acts as a hedge against uncertainty. 
 
3.1  General set-up and payoff structure 
 
Assume a two-period risk-neutral setting with perfect competition. A bank faces the choice of 
lending its initial endowment of $1 to either a long-term project or a short-term project as   6
described below
5. Alternatively, the bank could simply buy Treasury-bills yielding a risk-free 
interest rate normalized, without loss of generality, to equal zero.  
The long-term project lasts for two periods. At the beginning of period 1, it is common 
knowledge that the long-term project requires $1 bank finance to get started and, if 
successful, will yield a return equal to  (1+ α +ε)
2 only at the end of the second period. At the 
outset, the bank does not know ε but knows that ε is a random number that will be drawn at 
the end of period 1 from a zero-mean uniform distribution ε ∼ U (-σ- α, σ+ α) with α >0 and 
0<σ < 1. Thus, α  is the expected per-period return of the project. At the beginning of period 
1, the bank will lend $1 at the long-term per-period interest rate rL (0<rL<1). In the event of 
default (i.e. when the project return is smaller than rL), the bank recovers only (1-LGD)
2
 at the 
end of the two periods (where LGD stands for expected Loss Given Default per period, with 
0< LGD<1)
6. In any case, we assume that committing to a long-term loan prevents the bank 
from being able to re-optimize its lending strategy as new information is revealed over time 
(once ε is known). Moreover, we will assume for simplicity that it will not be possible to cash 
out either principal or interest invested in a long-term project until the end of the second 
period. In summary, the set-up of the long-term project can be illustrated as follows: 
 
TIMELINE OF LONG-TERM PROJECT 
 
    P e r i o d    1          P e r i o d    2 
 
 
Bank lends $1            ε  is known but               Bank collects principal 
at interest rate r L.          no renegotiation              and interest due (1+ rL)
2   
                   is allowed.               or recovers only (1-LGD)
2
 
                            in  the  event  of  default. 
 
The other alternative is for the bank to invest in a sequence of two short-term projects, each 
one lasting for one period only. At the beginning of period 1, it is common knowledge that 
short-term projects require $1 bank finance to get started and, if successful, yield a per-period 
                                                      
5 For the purpose of contrasting the two options of lending long-term vs. short-term, we will simply assume in 
this stylised model that banks cannot mix short-term and long-term loans in their portfolio. For a more detailed 
model explaining optimal combinations of short-term and long-term lending see for example Rey and Stiglitz 
(1993). Furthermore, we can think of a large number of identical projects that need a total start-up investment of 
$1. Given our focus here on the comparison between investing in long-term vs. short-term projects, we only 
need heterogeneity between and not within the two types of projects. 
6 In the event of the firm defaulting on her loan, the bank expects a non-zero recovery given the protection of 
collateral or loan covenants. Altman and Suggitt (2000) report estimates of LGDs for bank loans ranging from 
13% to 35% depending on seniority and computational assumptions employed.   7
return equal to (1+ α + ε). For simplicity, we assume that short-term projects yield the same 
return in each period. The bank does not know ε but knows that ε is a random number that 
will be drawn at the end of period 1 from a zero-mean uniform distribution ε ∼ U (-σ- α, σ+ 
α) with 0<σ < 1. Thus, α  is the expected per-period return of the project. At the beginning of 
period 1, the bank will lend $1 at the short-term per-period lending rate rS (0<rS<1). In the 
event of default (i.e. when project returns fall below rS) the bank recovers only 1-LGD per 
period. By choosing to lend short-term, the bank commits only for one period and will roll 
over the loan for the second period, only if project returns are above the debt service. In case 
of default at the end of the first period, the bank will instead cash out its first-period 
investment and keep its money in Treasury bills for the second period. The set-up of the 
short-term project can be summarized as follows: 
 
TIMELINE OF SHORT-TERM PROJECTS  
 
    P e r i o d    1          P e r i o d    2 
 
Bank lends $1            ε is known. If α + ε > rS the bank will          Bank collects principal 
at interest rate rS.         receive full principal and interest (1+ rS)      and interest due (1+ rS)
2   
and reinvest in the project at rate rS.   or recovers only (1-LGD) 
Otherwise it will recover only 1-LGD,          in the event of default. 
and invest in T-bills for the 2
nd period.              
 
 
Thus, the bank’s expected payoffs from lending either long-term or short-term are:
7  
 
() ( ) () ( )
2 2 1 ) 1 ( 1 L L L L r r h LGD r h + + − + − + = Π σ σ      (1) 
() ( ) () ( ) c r r h LGD r h S S S S − + + − + − + = Π
2 1 ) 1 ( 1 σ σ      (2) 
where h = 
() α σ + 2
1  and we have assumed no time discounting. The bank incurs a transaction 
cost c in the case of repeated short-term lending contracts.  
                                                      
7 The default probability on the long-term project is: Prob { (1+ α +ε)
2 < (1 + r L )
2 } = Prob { ε < r L - α } = h ( 
σ+r L ), where h is the probability density function. Similarly, the default probability on the short-term project is 
h ( σ+r S ).   8
3.2  The  impact of higher volatility on the optimal debt maturity choice  
 
Based on the assumptions and pay-off structures illustrated in the previous subsection, a few 
preliminary conclusions can be drawn comparing the profits that the bank can expect from 
lending long-term vs. short-term. On the one hand, short-term lending appears more flexible 
in adjusting to extreme project outcomes. In case of unexpectedly low revenues from the 
projects (i.e. very low values of ε), short-term loans are preferable as they allow the bank to 
exit the investment early and limit the losses. On the other hand, though, in a low-risk 
environment financing long-term projects can be more productive (in fact it is reasonable to 
assume that r L > r S) and will reduce transaction costs.  
In order to analyze the impact of return volatility on the bank’s expected profits, we 
differentiate (1) and (2) with respect to σ, obtaining: 









+ − − −
=
∂
Π ∂ L L L r LGD r      (3) 
 









+ − − −
=
∂
Π ∂ S S S r LGD r      ( 4 )    
 
Under the restriction that r L < α and r S < α (i.e. debt service is below the expected returns of 
the projects)
8, it is straightforward to show that both partial derivatives (3) and (4) are 
negative. For given interest rates
9, a higher volatility (σ) increases projects’ default 
probabilities and consequently reduces lenders’ expected profits for both long-term and short-
term lending. Furthermore, given that (1-LGD)
2 <1-LGD, partial derivative (3) will be higher 
in absolute value compared to (4). This is because the possibility of exiting the investment 
after a first-period default limits the losses in case of short-term lending.  
Summarizing, in a low-risk environment long-term lending can be more productive and 
associated with lower transaction costs. As σ increases, however, there is a higher probability 
of very bad states of nature (i.e. a higher probability mass gets shifted to the tails of the 
distribution of ε). In this case, short-term lending becomes the superior choice as it allows 
banks to exit the investment early instead of having to continue lending to an unprofitable 
                                                      
8
 This restriction is easily satisfied by most realistic projects whose default probabilities (h(σ+rL) or h(σ+rS)) are 
lower than 50%. 
9 We are concerned here with only the short-term impact of volatility on lenders’ profits. In the long run, a 
higher volatility of project returns will lead to a reallocation of banks’ portfolio from long-term to short-term 
lending until a new equilibrium interest rate is reached.    9
project. What is driving the bank’s preference for short-term lending as volatility increases is 
the option-like nature of short-term contracting (i.e. capping the downside risk by cashing out 
1-LGD at the end of period 1). In this sense, short-term lending can be a valuable hedge 
against uncertainty. 
 
4. Short-term lending as a screening device 
 
This section extends the previous analysis to a more general dynamic set-up with asymmetric 
information. When the probability of default is private information of the firms, banks may 
initially use short-term lending as a screening device until more information is known about 
the credit quality of the borrowers and it becomes safer to commit to long-term loans. The 
higher the degree of asymmetric information, the more screening will be necessary through 
short-term contracting.   
4.1  Dynamic contracting with asymmetric information 
 
Consider a multi-period competitive screening game under asymmetric information. Banks 
are all identical whereas firms can be of two types: high default risk (qH) and low default risk 
(qL) with qH > qL.
10 At the outset, the bank does not know which type of firm it is facing. 
However, it has prior beliefs that the firm is high risk with a probability μ
H and is low risk 
with a probability 1- μ
H. At the beginning of the period, each bank makes a take-it-or-leave-it 
offer to a firm of lending $1 at a given per-period interest rate rt. The firm will decide 
whether to accept or reject the offer, based on its private information about its own default 
risk q. In particular, in a discrete-time framework we can simply express ex-ante expected 
payoff at time t0 both for the bank (π














, π δ π                   (5) 
                                                      
10 In an arbitrage-free risk-neutral framework in which all securities are valued based on the risk-free interest 
rate i and the equivalent martingale measure Q (see e.g. Harrison and Kreps, 1979), we assume for simplicity 
that default is an exogenous stochastic event and define default as an unpredictable jump in a Poisson process 
with intensity q (see Duffie and Singleton, 2003). In other words, this implies that the probability that the firm 
defaults over an interval of time (t, t+Δ), conditional on the firm not defaulting prior to t, is approximately qΔ 
(for very small Δ) under the equivalent martingale measure Q. In addition, we assume that the risk-free interest 
rate i and default risk q are time-invariant (i.e. the firm’s “type” remains the same throughout the game; see 
Besanko and Kanatas, 1996).   10
where: δ t (q) =e
t q i ) ( + −                                     (6) 
and  E
Q
0  denotes the expectation, under the risk-neutral probability measure Q, conditional on 
the information available at time t=0. Finally, i is the risk-free interest rate. It is important to 
note that the discount factor (δ t) is a function of q. In other words, it is common knowledge 
that a high-risk firm will be more myopic, i.e. more impatient about capturing profit 
opportunities earlier as opposed to later (δt (qH) < δt (qL) at each time t>0; see Figure 2). 
From a microeconomic perspective, a key reason why a bank could prefer short-term loans as 
opposed to long-term commitments lies in the possibility of renegotiating the terms of the 
loan over time as its information set increases (see also Section 3). In other words, the bank 
will be able in this case to offer at the beginning of each period t (for t = 1,…,T) a different 
interest rate r t , based on its beliefs μ t  which it can update given the entire history of the 
game up to time t. 
For these reasons, we will not attempt here to characterize the full set of equilibria that can be 
enforced with short-term contracts.
11 We will look for separating equilibria, in which the 
bank, different from the case of “pooling”, is able to extract information about the firm’s type 
in the course of the game. Our interest lies in particular in the subset of so-called “Partial 
Revelation Equilibria” (PBE). As will be seen more precisely below, in this class of equilibria 
the firm only partially reveals her type in the early stages of the game and the bank fully 
discovers the risk level of the firm only at a later stage, which we will denote with F (= Full 
Revelation Stage).
12 As information is revealed sequentially during the game, partial 
revelation equilibria offer a general set-up to assess the role of short-term contracts as a 
screening device.
13 
More precisely, we define the full revelation stage as the period F ( 0<F<T ) when by offering 
rF the bank is sure that in equilibrium the firm will fully reveal its type. In other words, the 
                                                      
11 An equilibrium (Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium) will be defined as a set of strategies and beliefs such that: i) 
strategies are sequentially optimal given beliefs; ii) beliefs are derived from equilibrium strategies and observed 
actions using Bayes’ rule whenever possible. 
12 The full revelation stage F is endogenous depending on the speed of information revelation. We will discuss 
the determinants of F in Section 4.3. 
13 In particular, we have assumed that there is a simple type of contract between the bank and the firm: a 
sequence of short-term loans before information is fully revealed and a long-term loan after the full revelation of 
credit information. Before the full revelation stage F, both parties meet at each time t and the bank retains the 
discretion of rolling over single-period contracts based on any new information it might learn during the game 
about the risk level of the firm. After the full revelation stage F, instead, the bank will fully commit to a whole 
vector of interest rate offers and offer a long-term loan with maturity till the end of the game. The set-up of the 
dynamic model is summarized in Figure 3.   11
bank knows that with probability 1 a high-risk firm will accept rF and a low-risk firm will 
reject it. This can be written as ξH (rF ) = 1 and ξL(rF ) = 0, where ξq (rt) is the posterior 
probability at time t that a firm of risk level q (which equals either qH or qL) will accept a 
given interest rate rt. 
In the event that a loan gets signed (x=1, otherwise x=0), the firm will be able to finance its 
projects and will earn each period a net return R(q). Firms with a higher (lower) q will 
undertake projects with higher (lower) risk and return
14. In no case will a firm accept a loan at 
an interest rate above the net return made on the project each period.
 15 We also assume that 
banks incur a cost (K) for providing funds to the firm, and the cost of funding for the bank is 
higher for lending to high-risk firms than that for lending to the low-risk firms, i.e. K(qH) > 
K(qL).
16 Putting all the pieces together, the pay-off of the firm (who knows her “type” q) can 







δ t x t [ R t – r t  ]         (7) 
 
The bank’s expected pay-off is: 
π
B
   =  E
Q








 x t c d t }                                       (8) 
where Γt ≡ [ (1-LGD) d t  + LGD δ t  ], the risk-free discount factor d t = e
 – i t , and δ, R, Γ and 
K are all functions of q. We assume that short-term contracting implies a transaction cost (c) 
incurred in every period t ≤ F. Given that the bank in case of default will be able to recover 
only a portion (1-LGD) of the principal and interests, its risk is partially reduced. This 
intuitively explains why it will discount interest payments from the firm at a rate Γt , which is 
a weighted average between the riskless (d t )  and the risky discount factors (δ t ) (see Duffie 
and Singleton, 2003). The costs of funding of each loan offer at time t (Kt) and transaction 
costs (c) incurred during the short-term lending phase (t ≤ F) are discounted using the risk-
free discount factor (d t) since they are the same in both default and no-default states.  
                                                      
14   Firms with a higher probability of default tend to “gamble for resurrection” (Ed Kane).  This assumption is 
in line with much of the literature that has applied the option pricing framework to characterize the risk-shifting 
incentives deriving from limited liability in a volatile financial environment.  
15
 In the symmetric information model presented in Section 3, we had considered a representative long-term 
project and a sequence of short-term projects, whose risk and returns were driven by a random variable ε and 
therefore unknown both to the bank and the firms running the projects. Here instead the risk/return profiles of 
the two types of firms, (qH, RH) and (qL, RL), are common knowledge. However, a firm’s type, i.e. which firm 
belongs to which risk/return pair, is not observable by the bank as it constitutes private information of the firm. 
16
 For instance, an important source of funding costs is capital requirements for banks: lending to a higher risk 
firm is more costly for a bank as it consumes more capital.   12
Given the setup and payoff structure illustrated above, consider now the following strategies: 






 for all t = 1, 2, …., F-1      before the firm’s type is revealed             (9a) 





  for all t = F+1, F+2, …., T      if the firm has revealed to be high risk     (9b) 





  for all t = F+1, F+2, …., T    if the firm has revealed to be low risk            (9c) 
 
This means that interest rate offers in equilibrium will satisfy a zero profit condition under 
perfect competition (i.e. banks’ profits in equation (8) equal zero for any t ≠ F, if interest rate 
r t follows strategies in Equations (9a), (9b) and (9c)). Similarly, perfect competition among 
firms will equalize the returns of high and low risk projects with their respective costs of 
funding (i.e. Equation (7) equals zero in equilibrium for any t ≠ F): 
 






> RL,t            for all t = 1, 2, …., F-1                           (10a) 










     for all t = F+1, …., T                           (10b) 
For all periods t<F, given that the interest rate offered by the bank (rt) is higher than RL (see 
Equation (10a)), low-risk firms always reject the loan offer (ξL (rt)=0, whereas high-risk firms 
accept the offer with probability ξH (rt ).  
What will be the interest rate the bank will charge to induce separation at time F in 
equilibrium? We show in the Appendix that, given our assumptions about the higher degree 
of “impatience” of high-risk firms (see Equation (6)), separation can be achieved in 
equilibrium, if the bank charges rF such that:  
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In the repeated rental model, Hart and Tirole (1988) argue that if the discount factor is high 
enough and T is large, then it is not possible to satisfy both incentive constraints and only 
pooling equilibria can be sustained. They also note, however, that this problem does not arise 
in case we allow for an intermediate form of commitment (long-term renegotiable contracts) 
which would make a “take the money and run” strategy no longer feasible.   13
Our model allows for separating equilibria even relying on short-term contracts alone.
 17 This 
is because discount factors here not only account for the time value of money, but also for the 
likelihood of default. As shown in Figure 2, high-risk firms are assumed to be more myopic 
(see the lower discount curve). Intuitively, they might be closer to default and hence care less 
about the future: a small profit (RH,F - rF) is more valuable to high-risk firms at time F than 











, , δ  in Equation (11). For the banks, giving a ‘carrot’ interest rate at time F 
represents an investment to obtain information about the borrower and then switch to more 
efficient long-term contracts. The cost to the bank of charging rF  < RH,F is more than 
compensated - after having separated firms - by the benefits of (1) increasing lending 
volumes (x=1 for all t>F) and (2) being able to discriminate interest rate offers by risk type.  
4.2  Main implications of the model and testable hypotheses 
 
In the above analysis, the contract between the bank and the firm has two components: an 
initial short-term screening component under asymmetric information and a long-term 
lending component under perfect information. In this subsection, we will examine how the 
timing of information revelation (early revelation vs. late revelation) affects the relative 
length of these two components. In addition, we will use the results obtained so far to analyze 
how the bank’s optimal choice between long-term and short-term lending might differ from 
the social optimum depending on the timing of information revelation. Finally, we will 
discuss which factors influence the timing of information revelation (F) and thus debt 
maturity structure. This will allow us to draw a number of key implications from the model 
and outline our main testable hypotheses which will be analyzed in Section 5. 
As seen in Section 4.1, the later new information is revealed to the bank about the type of the 
firm it is facing (i.e. the larger is F), the longer the relative length of the period in which 
banks roll over short-term loans to screen borrowers. In contrast, the earlier new information 
is revealed to the bank about the firm’s type (i.e. the smaller is F), the longer the relative 
length of the period under perfect information, and more long-term lending should be 
observed (Figure 3).  
                                                      
17 Admati and Perry (1987) use a similar concept of separating equilibrium, where the degree of impatience of 
firms determines in equilibrium the time delays in accepting offers by different types of firms.   14
Table 1 summarizes the main results of the models in sections 3 and 4 for various parameter 
assumptions and indicates whether banks’ optimal debt maturity choices correspond also to 





F }) by both reducing the socially wasteful transaction costs of rolling 






). In contrast, 
rolling over short- term lending is not socially optimal as it increases transaction costs of the 
economy and leads to the possibility of credit rationing.
18  
Thus, a key implication of our model is that short-term lending acts as a screening device and 
will be chosen in equilibrium by banks- although socially suboptimal - in case that credit 
information about the borrower is poor and hence the revelation process takes longer. Even 
though the asymmetric information model presented in this section has different setup from 
the symmetric information model introduced in Section 3, both models convey a similar 
message: uncertainty or the lack of information about borrowers’ credit quality leads banks to 
prefer short-term lending in equilibrium, although it may not be the socially optimal outcome.  
We now consider a particular set of partial revelation equilibria in order to illustrate the 
determinants of the speed of the information revelation process (i.e. the determinants of F). 
We analyze the case in which the firm rejects the short-term loan offer each period (rt = RH,t 
for t<F; see Equation (9a) and (10a)).  From Bayes’ rule, the posterior probability that the 
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where ξH is the posterior probability that a firm of risk level H will accept a given interest rate 
RH (ξH = Prob. (Accept RH | High Risk)), ξL is the posterior probability that a firm of risk 
level L will accept a given interest rate RH (ξL = Prob. (Accept RH | Low Risk))
19, 
H
t μ is the 
posterior probability at time t that a firm is of risk level H, and 
L
t μ is the posterior probability 
at time t that a firm is of risk level L. 
                                                      
18 Unlike in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), it is the low-risk firms that are credit rationed in our model during the 
screening phase. 
19
 As discussed in Section 4.1, we assume that low-risk firms always reject the loan offer (ξL (rt )=0 for all t < F) 
due to the rationality constraint. Our results are robust if there is a non-zero probability that low risk firms make 
mistakes by accepting the interest rate offer (RH). Simulation results are available upon request.   15
We simulate the set of partial revelation equilibria and the results are shown in Figure 4.  We 
find that high quality of information (eg. ξH increasing from 30% to 70% - see Figure 4, panel 
A) increases the slope of the learning curve and the speed of the information revelation 
process. As a result, information about the risk of the firm is revealed earlier to the bank (eg. 
F decreases from over 11 to 5 – see Figure 4, panel A), and consequently the bank will prefer 
to lend less short-term and more long-term. Furthermore, we find that the length of the credit 
screening phase (F) is a positive function of the prior probability of the firms being high risk 
(μ
H).
20 This implies that one should observe more short-term debt in countries with higher 
credit risk environments, consistent with the model discussed in Section 3.  
In line with the literature, we have described a stylized setup where the interest rate is used as 
a screening device to induce firms to self-reveal their types. However, based on the revelation 
principle, our results can be applied in practice to a number of alternative mechanisms for 
information revelation, including for example credit registries, credit ratings or relationship 
banking.
 21 The theoretical analysis discussed so far leads us to formulate the following 
empirical hypothesis: 
For a given level of risk (μ
H), we expect better quality of credit information (higher ξH) to be 
associated with a higher ratio of long-term to total corporate debt. 
22 
In order to test this hypothesis with empirical data, we will use the existence and coverage of 
private/public credit bureaus and an index of accounting standards to proxy for the quality of 
credit information across countries and over time. As it is also important to control for the 
impact of the risk of a country’s economy (μ
H) on debt maturity, we will use variables on 
legal institutions, financial development, macroeconomic environment and firm 
characteristics (including dispersion of firm default probabilities) as additional determinants 
of the debt maturity structure. 
                                                      
20  F increases from 8 to 10 as μ
H goes from 30% to 70% (see Figure 4 Panel B).  
21 Consistent with our model, several studies have found that loan contract terms generally improve for the 
borrower over the life of banking relationships, especially in the US: interest rates and collateral requirements 
fall (see, e.g. Berger and Udell, 1995, and Berger, Rosen and Udell, 2002) and the availability of credit increases 
(see, e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 1994). This is consistent with the view that relationship banking facilitates value-
enhancing exchange of credit information (although methodological issues have been raised recently by Brick, 
Kane and Palia, 2004). See also Lummer and McConnell (1989) for empirical evidence on information 
acquisition in bank lending. Some other studies, in the European context, have found that loan rates may 
increase with the duration of banking relationship due to the hold-up problem (see, e.g. Degryse and Van 
Cayseele, 2000). See Boot (2000) and Degryse and Ongena (2006) for reviews of the related literature. In 
addition to credit registries and relationship banking, credit ratings by agencies such as S&P or Moody’s help to 
reveal firms’ credit information. However, except for a few well-developed markets such as US, UK and Japan, 
in most other countries only a very small share of firms has a credit rating (Estrella, 2000). 
22 This is consistent with the prediction of the signalling story developed by Flannery (1986) and Diamond 
(1991), who show that debt maturity is longer when there are less information asymmetries.   16
5. Empirical evidence  
 
5.1. Data  
In order to examine the determinants of the debt maturity structure of firms in countries at 
different levels of development, we construct a novel database including a number of 
institutional, macro and micro variables, as briefly illustrated below.  
We measure the debt maturity structure of a firm by the ratio of short-term debt (i.e. debt 
obligations with maturity less than one year) to total debt in the firm’s balance sheet. We 
calculate averages of this ratio across firms for each country, including all countries for 
which we have data for at least 20 firms, and these firms represent more than 20 percent of 
the stock market capitalization in that country (source: WorldScope). Our sample covers a 
total of 14,178 publicly listed firms in 27 industrial economies and 18 developing economies 
over the period 1994-2004.
23  
As postulated in Section 4.2, improvements in credit information quality are likely to increase 
the maturity horizon at which financial institutions feel safe to lend. We employ three 
measures of credit information quality: (i) the existence of a public registry or a private 
bureau, (ii) the extent of coverage of individuals and companies by public registries or private 
bureaus and (iii) the quality of accounting standards reported in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) (hereafter LLSV).
24 The main sources for these data are the 
                                                      
23 The industrial economies in our sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong (China), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan (China), United 
Kingdom, and United States. The developing countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russian Federation, South 
Africa, Taiwan, China, Thailand, and Turkey.  
24 The credit bureau coverage variables have more cross-country and time-series variation, but may be 
predominantly driven by the coverage of retail borrowers rather than corporate loans. This problem is less 
pronounced for Public Credit Registries, as most of them have loan cut-off minimum amounts, usually 
excluding retail or small business loans. The indicator variables for the existence of private or public credit 
bureaus are more likely to reflect the availability of credit information on both individuals and firms, but show 
less variation than coverage variables as they are binary dummies. The indicator and coverage variables of 
private credit bureaus are highly correlated with the “Credit Information Index” reported in the World Bank/IFC 
“Doing Business” database, which measures the extent of credit information available on individuals and firms 
through either public or private credit registries (correlation coefficients are 0.79 and 0.42 respectively and 
statistically significant). Additionally, we find that countries with higher coverage of private credit bureaus also 
have higher percentage of firms rated by either S&P or Moody's (the correlation coefficient is 0.38 and 
statistically significant). We also use a measure of the quality of accounting standards across countries, which 
captures more directly the availability of credit information about firms. However, this variable shows little 
time-series variation. As each of these proxies for the quality of credit information have their own advantages 
and disadvantages, we will employ several of them in alternative specifications of our baseline regression. It is 
interesting to note that our main results remain unchanged whichever proxy is chosen.   17
World Bank/IFC “Doing Business” database as well as the World Bank Public and Private 
Credit Registries Surveys. In addition, we obtain the credit registries establishment dates 
from Miller (2003), Love and Mylenko (2003), and Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2006). 
The differences in corporate debt maturity structures across countries may reflect varying 
quality of legal institutions and contracting environments (see Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1998). In particular, we control for the impact of the legal framework by 
including variables on countries’ legal origins, shareholder rights and creditor rights (see 
LLSV, 1998)
25, as well as the corruption perception indices provided by Transparency 
International.  
In order to control for the degree of domestic financial development, we use the ratio of total 
deposits in the financial system to GDP, the ratio of the private bond market capitalization to 
GDP, and the ratio of overhead costs to bank assets (as a measure of banking sector 
efficiency) obtained from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000). In addition, we control 
for whether or not a country is one of the world’s major financial centers, i.e. US, UK, 
Switzerland and Japan, and whether or not the country has had a systemic banking crisis as 
defined in Caprio and Klingebiel (2003).   
Macroeconomic variables may also influence firms’ choices of debt maturity. In particular, 
GDP growth rate is a proxy for the investment opportunity set faced by firms (Smith and 
Watts, 1992), and the inflation rate provides evidence for firms and banks on whether the 
local currency is a stable measure of value to be used in long-term contracting. Hence we 
include among our controls the growth rate of GDP per capita as well as indices of consumer 
price inflation. A dummy variable is also added to control for any structural differences 
between developed and developing economies not already captured by other explanatory 
variables.  
                                                      
25 The LLSV shareholder rights variable measures the costs faced by minority investors who want to influence 
decision-making within the firm. It is obtained by adding a score of one for each of the following elements: (i) 
shareholders are allowed to vote by mail, (ii) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares with a trustee 
prior to voting, (iii) the law allows cumulative voting for directors, (iv) the law gives minority shareholders 
special protection, (v) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an 
extraordinary general meeting is less than or equal to 10%, and (vi) shareholders have pre-emptive rights that 
can only be waived by a shareholder vote. The LLSV creditor rights variable is obtained by adding a score of 
one for each of the following provisions of creditor protections: (i) the bankruptcy laws prohibit an automatic 
stay on assets, (ii) secured creditors are permitted to repossess their collateral in bankruptcy, (iii) the bankruptcy 
law prohibits borrowers from unilaterally obtaining court protection from creditor demands, and (iv) creditors 
can dismiss managers and replace them with administrators when a firm becomes bankrupt. We use the creditor 
rights variable reported in Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2006), who introduce time-variations in the index 
due to reforms of bankruptcy laws.    18
Finally, we use a set of micro-level variables to control for the differences in firm 
characteristics across countries. First, larger firms may face reduced information asymmetries 
and less financial constraints. Therefore we control for firm size by using the natural 
logarithm of firms’ total assets. Second, we use the return on assets to capture profitability 
and liquidity of firms. Third, the ratio of fixed assets to total assets is included to reflect the 
maturity structure of firms’ assets. Firms with more fixed assets have higher collateral value 
but lower asset liquidity (Grudes and Opler, 1996) and tend to raise more long-term debt in 
order to match the maturity of their assets and liabilities (Stohs and Mauer, 1996). Fourth, we 
include the standard deviation of firms’ default probabilities in each country, based on 
Altman’s (1968) Z-score, to control for the higher dispersion in the credit quality of firms in 
certain markets and hence the banks’ increased need for screening their clients (as implied by 
our model in Section 4).  
 
5.2. Econometric results 
 
We start with a brief review of bivariate correlations among the key variables that will enter 
our analysis. Figure 5 displays the average ratios of short-term debt to total debt for firms in 
our sample of 45 countries over the 1994-2004 period. China has the highest short-term debt 
ratio, whereas the United States have the lowest, at about one-third of China’s. There is a 
clustering of developing countries at the top of the range, such as Malaysia, Turkey and 
Hungary, indicating that firms in low-income countries use more short-term debt as a 
proportion of total debt.
  Additionally, we find the short-term debt ratio to be positively 
correlated with countries’ corruption levels, inflation rates, firms’ default probabilities and 
domestic banks’ non-performing loans (see Figures A1 and A2 in the Appendix). Figure 7 
shows the key scatter-plots, which will be the focus of our empirical analysis. They suggest a 
negative correlation between short-term debt ratios and variables capturing the quality of 
credit information, namely the coverage of private credit bureaus and the quality of 
accounting standards.
 26  
                                                      
26 In Appendix Table A1, we report the average short-term debt ratio, the average private and public credit 
registries coverage, the average annual GDP growth and consumer price inflation rate for each country in our 
sample over the 1994-2004 period. We find that credit bureaus in countries with the lowest short-term debt 
ratios, namely US, Norway, New Zealand and Canada, have a higher than 80% coverage of the population, 
whereas the coverage in China is zero.   19
Figure 6 shows on the world map which countries currently have public credit registries, 
private credit bureaus or both. Many countries started their public or private credit bureaus 
during our sample period, which allows us to evaluate the impact of institutional reforms in 
credit reporting systems on corporate debt maturities. For instance, Peru, Portugal and 
Thailand established their first private bureaus in 1995, 1996 and 1999, respectively. After 
these dates, the average short-term to total debt ratios for firms in these countries dropped by 
8%, 8% and 9%, respectively, compared to the years prior to the establishment of credit 
bureaus. In addition, according to the Loanware/Bondware Capital Markets database, the 
average maturity of loans and bonds for borrowers domiciled in these countries appears 
significantly longer after the establishment of credit bureaus than before (the increases in 
average maturities of loans and bonds for borrowers domiciled in each of these countries 
were 130%, 70% and 40%, respectively, comparing the period before and after the 
establishment of credit bureaus). This anecdotal evidence seems to confirm the above 
documented correlations between credit information quality and debt maturity. 
In order to control for other concomitant factors which may also be affecting corporate debt 
maturity, we attempt to disentangle the impact of better credit information by estimating the 
following panel regression: 
STD/TD  = f (Credit Information Quality, Macroeconomic Environment, Firm 
Characteristics, Country Fixed Effects, Year Fixed Effects) 
where the dependent variable STD/TD is the average short-term debt to total debt ratio of all 
available listed companies for each country in each year. Our estimation sample contains 
country-year observations for 45 countries over 11 years. Panel A of Table 2 presents 
summary statistics for the variables used in our regression analysis and Panel B provides 
more details on variable definitions and data sources. 
We proxy for Credit Information Quality using indicator variables capturing the existence of 
private and public credit registries. Furthermore, GDP Growth and Inflation are included to 
control for the Macroeconomic Environment. We also include four variables to account for 
specific Firm Characteristics: Log of Total Assets, Return on Assets, the Fixed Assets to 
Total Assets ratio, and the Dispersion of Default Risks. We introduce both Country Fixed 
Effects and Year Fixed Effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity across countries and 
over time.    20
Panel A of Table 3 presents the results. We find that the establishment of private credit 
bureaus in a country reduces its average short-term to total debt ratio in the corporate sector 
by about 3% ceteris paribus, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. This result is 
consistent with our hypothesis that better credit information reduces the need for banks to use 
short-term debt as a screening device (see Section 4). Our findings also support the prediction 
by Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991) that debt maturity is shorter when there are more 
information asymmetries.  
As for macroeconomic fundamentals, lower GDP growth rate and/or higher inflation are 
associated with a shortening of debt maturity (consistent with the literature). Furthermore, 
firm characteristics appear important in explaining within country variation in corporate debt 
maturities over time: adding these variables in the regressions improves the R-squared 
(within group) by 17%. In line with our expectations, larger and/or more profitable firms 
obtain easier access to long-term finance. Although we only have data for publicly listed 
firms, which tend to be relatively large firms, we expect that the effect of better credit 
information in lengthening debt maturities would be even stronger for smaller unlisted firms, 
which generally have no credit ratings and present higher informational asymmetries. 
In order to further examine the institutional determinants of corporate debt maturity structure 
around the world, we next turn to estimate the following panel regression: 
STD/TD  = f (Credit Information Quality, Legal Institutions, Financial Development, 
Macroeconomic Environment, Firm Characteristics, Year Fixed Effects) 
where we have replaced country fixed effects with several institutional variables capturing 
different degrees of development in the legal framework and the financial sector across 
countries.  We include a Common Law Origin indicator, Shareholder Rights, Creditor Rights, 
and a Corruption index as measures of the quality of Legal Institutions. Furthermore, we use 
five variables to capture the degree of domestic Financial Development, namely the Deposit 
to GDP ratio, the Private Bond to GDP ratio, the Bank Costs to Assets ratio, a Financial 
Center indicator and a Banking Crisis indicator.  
As a robustness check on the regression in Panel A, we employ alternative proxies for Credit 
Information Quality, namely the coverage of public and private credit registries as well as a 
measure of the quality of accounting standards. 
Results are shown in Panel B of Table 3. We find that firms in countries with better credit 
information have a lower ratio of short-term to total debt on average. This suggests that   21
improvements in the coverage of public and especially private credit registries, as well as in 
the quality of accounting standards, may increase firms’ access to long-term finance. These 
findings confirm our previous results reported in Panel A of Table 3.  
Additionally, the quality of the legal framework appears an important determinant of 
corporate debt maturity. Consistent with Fan, Titman and Twite (2006), we find a higher 
share of long-term corporate debt in less corrupted countries and in countries with common 
law origins. As pointed out by LLSV (1998), countries with a common-law tradition provide 
better protections for shareholder and creditor rights. After controlling for countries’ legal 
origins, we find a higher share of long-term corporate debt in countries where creditor rights 
protection is relatively poor, a result similar to that of Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1999). This is consistent with the view that poor protection of creditor rights may cause 
lenders to liquidate short-term loans at maturity even for good borrowers. Thus, borrowers 
have an incentive to lock in long-term loans in order to avoid the liquidation risk (see 
Diamond, 1991). 
We also find that corporate debt maturity is influenced by the development of domestic 
financial markets. In general, countries with a large banking sector, compared to the size of 
their economy, are characterized by a higher share of short-term corporate debt, similar to the 
finding by Fan, Titman and Twite (2006). We also observe a significant shortening of the 
maturity structure of corporate debt during banking crises (consistent with the literature).  
Furthermore, a number of firm characteristics, in addition to firm size and profitability, 
appear relevant in explaining corporate debt maturity structures across countries. By taking 
into account both cross-country and time-series variations in firm characteristics, we find that 
firms with more fixed assets tend to borrow long term, consistent with the hypothesis that 
firms try to match the maturity of their assets and liabilities (see, Stohs and Mauer, 1996). 
Finally, countries with higher dispersion of firms’ credit qualities are characterized by more 
long-term debt. This is consistent with our theoretical predictions in Section 4: when the pool 
of obligors is more heterogeneous, screening high-risk from low-risk firms is relatively 
easier. By contrast, when differences in default risks among firms are more opaque, screening 
may take longer and banks need to resort to more short-term lending.  This is also consistent 
with Flannery’s (1986) prediction that debt maturity is an upward-sloping function of risk. 
The overall conclusion of our empirical analysis is that – controlling for other macro and 
micro characteristics – the quality of credit information and the legal framework are crucial   22
determinants of firms’ debt maturity choices around the world. Comparing the R-squared of 
the regressions across the three columns of Panel B of Table 3, we find that our proxies for 
Credit Information Quality and Legal Institutions explain together 44% of the variation in the 
maturity structure of corporate debt, whereas adding financial development, macro and micro 
variables only increases the R-squared by an additional 19%.
27  
 
5.3. Robustness checks 
 
We have performed a number of robustness checks for our results (available on request). 
First, different measures of the debt maturity structure were used. For instance, following 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), we used the ratio of short-term debt to total assets. 
We also used the medians (instead of the means) of the short-term debt ratios and our results 
are unchanged. 
Second, alternative specifications of explanatory variables were employed. For instance, we 
used interchangeably indicator variables for the establishment of credit registries, credit 
bureau coverage variables and an overall index of the quality of credit information. We 
replaced the corruption index by the Rule of Law variable obtained from International 
Country Risk Guide and also included alternative macro and micro characteristics variables 
such as bank concentration, non-performing loans and market-to-book ratios of firms. These 
variables were not included in the final specification either because of correlations with other 
variables or because of limits on data availability. Our main results are robust to alternative 
specifications of the model. 
Third, we investigated potential endogeneity bias in our regressions. In particular, the 
development of domestic financial sectors as well as firms’ profitability and default risk may 
be influenced by firms’ financial decisions including debt maturity choices.
28 To address this 
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 This result appears even stronger when we analyze the sub-samples of developed and developing economies, 
separately. For developed economies, we find that credit information and the legal framework are the driving 
factors of debt maturity choices, explaining 74% of the variations in the debt maturity structure. In contrast, 
including macro and micro variables only marginally improves the R-squared by 12%. 
28
 In their analysis to explain debt maturity structure, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) use bank assets 
divided by GDP to proxy for the size of banking sector, which might be endogenous as the size is affected by 
the aggregate decisions of all firms (The authors use two-stage regressions to control for this dependence). Our 
proxy for financial development, deposits of total financial system to GDP, may be less affected by a potential 
endogeneity problem because the amount of short-term funds (i.e. deposits) that are available to the domestic 
financial system can be regarded as exogenous with respect to firms’ financial decisions measures (see Fan,   23
issue, we use one-year lagged values of financial development variables (except the financial 
center and banking crisis indicators) and firm characteristics variables as instruments. This 
instrumental variable approach assumes that past values of these variables are correlated with 
their current values but not with the current error terms. The instrumental variable regression 
confirms our main results reported in Table 3.  
Fourth, alternative estimation methodologies were employed. In addition to our baseline 
fixed-effects and pooled OLS regressions, we estimated the model with random-effects 
estimators and cross-sectional estimators. We also used clustered standard errors to take into 
account autocorrelation of observations within a country. In all of these tests, our main results 
remain unchanged. 
 
6. Conclusion and policy implications 
 
A common problem faced by many firms around the world is the scarce availability of long-
term sources of funds. Exclusive reliance on short-term borrowing may expose companies to 
illiquidity risks and reduce their overall growth potential. To address these issues, many 
countries have embarked on policies promoting the development of long-term loan or bond 
markets with mixed results. However, while the negative implications of excessive short-term 
borrowing on growth and stability are well known (eg. Chang and Velasco, 2001 and 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998), there is no consensus on its underlying determinants 
and hence the main priorities for reform. 
This paper provides new theoretical and empirical evidence suggesting that the quality of 
credit information may be a key element to explain the maturity structure of corporate debt. 
From the perspective of the lender, the optimal choice of corporate debt maturity is analyzed 
in a dynamic model both under incomplete but symmetric information and with asymmetric 
information. In markets with poor credit information and hence a high degree of uncertainty 
about borrower quality, we find suboptimal equilibria in which short-term contracts are 
preferred either as a hedge against uncertainty to limit losses in bad states (in the symmetric 
information case) or as a screening device to learn about borrower credit quality in the course 
of a repeated lending relationship (in the asymmetric information case).  
                                                                                                                                                                   
Titman, and Twite, 2006). In addition, our results are unchanged if we use the stock market turnover ratio 
(which are exogenous with respect to firms’ debt maturity choices) as an instrument to the size of debt markets.    24
The implications of the model are supported by panel data from both developed and 
developing countries. Our main finding is that better credit information (as proxied by the 
existence and coverage of private and public credit registries as well as by improvements in 
accounting standards) is associated with a higher share of long-term debt as a proportion of 
total corporate debt. This does not imply that, in and of itself, better credit information is a 
sufficient condition for developing long-term corporate debt markets. Our results do suggest, 
however, that improving credit reporting systems and accounting standards around the world 
may increase the maturity horizon at which financial institutions feel safe to lend. This would 
contribute to lengthening the maturity structure of corporate debt thus placing firms on a 
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Table 1: Main implications of the model 
 




Contracting environment  Information 
Revelation  




Symmetric   High σ  High risk environment    Short-Term  No 
Information  Low σ  Low risk environment    Long-Term  Yes 
Asymmetric   High ξH   High information quality   Early revelation   Long-Term  Yes 
Information Low  ξH  Low information quality  Late revelation   Short-Term   No 





Table 2: Summary statistics and variable definitions 
 
This table presents the summary statistics (Panel A) and variable definitions and sources (Panel B) for our 
regression data. Variables with a prefix “D” are binary dummies. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
  Variables Mean  Median  Std.  Dev. 
Short-Term Debt  STD/TD  46.13 47.10 11.52 
Information   Private Credit Bureau Cov.  33.33  22.70  30.34 
Asymmetries  Public Credit Registry Cov.  3.74  0.00  9.74 
  Accounting  Standards  62.74 64.00 11.24 
Legal   D Common Law  0.30  0.00  0.46 
Institutions  Shareholder  Rights  3.56 4.00 1.06 
  Creditor  Rights  2.08 2.00 1.31 
  Corruption  4.06 4.20 2.45 
Financial   Deposit /GDP  70.78  57.10  47.11 
Development  Private Bond /GDP  0.22  0.15  0.25 
  Bank  Costs  /Assets  0.04 0.03 0.02 
  D  Financial  Center  0.09 0.00 0.28 
  D Banking Crisis  0.18  0.00  0.38 
Macroeconomic    GDP  Growth  3.19 3.00 3.94 
Environment Inflation  7.94 2.83 24.08 
  D Developed Country  0.55  1.00  0.50 
Firm  Log of Total Assets  13.80  13.78  0.93 
Characteristics  Return  on  Assets  4.70 4.92 6.97 
  Fixed Assets /Total Assets  0.14  0.13  0.09 




 Panel B: Variable definitions and sources 
 
  Variables  Descriptions and Data Source 
Share of Short-
Term Debt 
STD/TD  Short-term debt (i.e. less than one year maturity) divided by total debt of a 
firm. Average across firms in each country. Source: Worldscope and 
World Bank FSDI 
Private Credit Bureau 
(D- / -Cov.) 
Variable with a prefix “D”: Dummy =1 if a private credit bureaus exists; 
Variable with a postfix “Cov.”: Private credit bureaus coverage as a % of 
the adult population. Source: Doing Business (2006), Miller (2003), Love 
and Mylenko (2003) and Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2006) 
Public Credit Registry 
(D- / -Cov.) 
Variable with a prefix “D”: Dummy =1 if a public credit registry exists; 
Variable with a postfix “Cov.”: Public credit registries coverage as a % of 
the adult population. Source: Doing Business (2006), Miller (2003), Love 
and Mylenko (2003) and Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2006) 
Credit Information 
Index 
The index ranges from 0 to 6, with a score of 1 assigned for each of 
the following 6 features of the credit information system: 
. Both positive and negative credit information is distributed. 
. Data on both firms and individuals are distributed. 
. Data from retailers, trade creditors or utilities as well as financial 
institutions are distributed. 
. More than 2 years of historical data are distributed. 
. Data on loans above 1% of income per capita are distributed. 




Accounting Standards  Accounting standard ratings in 1990 (0 worst-100 best). Source: LLSV 
(1998) 
D Common Law  Dummy =1 if legal origin is common law, and =0 if the origin is civil law 
or socialist. Source: LLSV (1998) 
Shareholder Rights  Shareholder right index (i.e. new anti-director index) (0 least - 6 most 
rights). Source: LLSV (1998) 
Creditor Rights  Creditor right index (0 least - 4 most rights). Source: LLSV (1998) and 
Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2006) 
Legal 
Institutions 
Corruption  Corruption perception index (reversed: 0 least - 10 most corrupted). 
Source: Transparency International 
Deposit  /GDP  Demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions as a share of GDP. Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine (2000) 
Private  Bond  /GDP  Private bond market capitalization divided by GDP.  Source: Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000) 
Bank Costs /Assets  Banks' overhead costs divided by bank assets in each country. Source: 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000) 
D  Financial  Center  Dummy =1 if the country is US, UK, Switzerland, or Japan, and =0 




D  Banking  Crisis  Dummy =1 if there is a systemic banking crises, and =0 otherwise. 
Source: Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) 
GDP Growth  Growth rate of GDP per capita. Source: World Development Indicators 
Inflation  Consumer Price Inflation. Source: World Development Indicators 
Macro 
Environment 
D  Developed  Country  Dummy =1 if the country is a developed country, and =0 if it is a 
developing country. The classification is based on Gross National Income 
per capita. Source: World Bank 
Log of Total Assets  Natural logarithm of average total assets (in thousand US$) across firms 
in each country. Source: Worldscope and World Bank FSDI  
Return on Assets  Return of assets (net income before interest divided by total assets of a 
firm). Average across firms in each country. Source: Worldscope and 
World Bank FSDI 
Fixed Assets /Total 
Assets 
Fixed assets (net property, plant and equipment) divided by total assets of 
a firm. Average across firms in each country. Source: Worldscope and 
World Bank FSDI 
Firm 
Characteristics 
Dispersion of Default 
Risk 
Standard deviation of default probabilities (based on Altman’s (1968) Z-




 Table 3  - Determinants of debt maturity structure 
The tables below present our estimation results for the determinants of corporate debt maturity structure. The 
dependent variable is the average ratio of short-term debt to total debt of firms in each of the countries in our 
sample (STD/TD). The explanatory variables in Panel A are credit information quality for model (1), all of the 
above plus macroeconomic environment in model (2), and finally all of the above plus firm characteristics in 
model (3). The explanatory variables in Panel B are credit information quality and legal institutions in model 
(1), all of the above plus financial development and macroeconomic environment in model (2), and finally all of 
the above plus firm characteristics in model (3). Panel A includes country and year effects whereas Panel B 
includes only year effects. The p-values are in parentheses, calculated with White standard errors to correct for 
potential heteroskedasticity. Bold coefficients indicate a statistical significance level of at least 10%. 
 
Panel A:  
Dependent Variable  STD/TD  (1)     (2)     (3)    
   Constant  48.45  (0.00)  48.56  (0.00)  111.08  (0.00) 
Credit Information Quality D Private Credit Bureau  -3.86  (0.00)  -3.58  (0.00)  -2.95  (0.01) 
   D Public Credit Registry  -1.21  (0.40)  -0.68  (0.66)  0.03  (0.98) 
Macro Environment  GDP Growth      -0.16  (0.02)  -0.14  (0.01) 
   Inflation        0.01  (0.06)  0.04  (0.00) 
Firm Characteristics  Log of Total Assets           -4.61  (0.00) 
  Return on Assets           -0.17  (0.01) 
  Fixed Assets /Total Assets           8.13  (0.25) 
   Dispersion of Default Risk              0.03  (0.57) 
Country Fixed Effects  D Country  Yes     Yes     Yes    
Year Fixed Effects  D Year  Yes     Yes     Yes    
  R-squared  (within)  0.12   0.13   0.30   
  R-squared  (overall)  0.92   0.93   0.94   
   Observations  461     452     434    
 
Panel B:  
Dependent Variable  STD/TD  (1)     (2)    (3)    
   Constant  62.39  (0.00)  54.66  (0.00)  128.54  (0.00) 
Credit Information QualityPrivate Credit Bureau Cov.  -0.08  (0.00)  -0.08  (0.00)  -0.06  (0.01) 
  Public Credit Registry Cov.  -0.03  (0.54)  -0.10  (0.07) -0.02  (0.67) 
   Accounting Standards  -0.09  (0.18)  -0.14  (0.07)  -0.16  (0.07) 
Legal Institutions  D Common Law  -5.15  (0.00)  -5.28  (0.00)  -5.83  (0.00) 
 Shareholder  Rights  -0.61  (0.27) 0.69  (0.26)  0.20  (0.74) 
 Creditor  Rights  3.85  (0.00)  2.90  (0.00)  2.59  (0.00) 
 Corruption  2.17  (0.00)  1.72  (0.00)  2.18  (0.00) 
Financial Development  Deposit /GDP      0.10  (0.00)  0.08  (0.00) 
  Private Bond /GDP      -1.62  (0.44)  2.57  (0.21) 
  Bank Costs /Assets      5.41  (0.87)  -3.05  (0.93) 
 D  Financial  Center      -3.81  (0.01) -0.01  (0.99) 
  D Banking Crisis      5.78  (0.00)  6.23  (0.00) 
Macro Environment  GDP Growth      -0.11  (0.46)  -0.13  (0.44) 
 Inflation      0.01  (0.59)  0.07  (0.02) 
 D  Developed  Country      -1.16  (0.53)  -3.52  (0.06) 
Firm Characteristics  Log of Total Assets           -3.79  (0.00) 
  Return on Assets           -0.31  (0.02) 
  Fixed Assets /Total Assets           -41.88  (0.00) 
  Dispersion of Default Risk           -0.34  (0.00) 
Year Fixed Effects  D Year  Yes     Yes     Yes    
  R-squared  0.44   0.55   0.63  
   Observations  370     331     319     
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Figure 1: Preference for long-term vs. short-term lending (πL vs. πS)  
                 as a function of the volatility of project returns (σ) 
 
Numerical example assuming α =0.3, rL = rS =0.2, LGD =0.5, c =0.1  



































Figure 3: Timeline of the dynamic model 
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Panel A: The impact of information quality (ξH ) on the speed of information revelation 
 
ξH = 30% (μ
H = 50%, ξL =0)         ξH = 70% (μ






















Panel B: The impact of the risk of environment (μ
H) on the speed of information revelation 
 
μ
H = 30% (ξH = 50%, ξL =0)         μ
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Figure 5: Average short-term debt to total debt ratios  
 
 
This figure presents the average short-term debt to total debt ratios of firms in each country for the 1994-2004 





















































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7: Short-term debt and credit information quality 
 
This figure presents the average short-term debt to total debt ratios (STD/TD) of firms in each country for the 
1994-2004 period. The Y-axis is STD/TD. The X-axes are the coverage of private credit registries or the quality 
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The dynamic model with asymmetric information: derivation of separating equilibria. 
 
We will show below how the strategies outlined in Section 4.1 can be sustained as a Partial 
Revelation Equilibrium (PBE) in which the bank uses short-term interest rate offers to 
effectively screen and ultimately separate firm types. 
Under perfect competition among banks, interest rates will equalize in equilibrium the cost of 
funding. As seen in Section 4.1, the cost of funding loans to high-risk firms is assumed to be 
higher than the cost of funding loans to low-risk firms. Thus, in a static framework, there are 
in principle two possible values of r for the bank to choose from (R H  or R L ). Under 
asymmetric information, the bank could either charge an interest rate R H and lend only to 
high-risk firms or offer R L and lend to both types of firms.
29 More formally: 
 
r (μ
H)     =    R H              if  μ
 H > μ* 
=    R L              if  μ
 H < μ*     (A4) 
=   either R H or  R L    if  μ 
H = μ* 
 
where μ* is the cut-off prior probability μ
H that makes the bank indifferent ex-ante between 
lending at RH  only in the event that the firm is high risk and lending at R L  in either case, i.e. 
whichever the firm’s risk level.  
This extends to the dynamic model of section 4.1 as follows. To support the strategies (9), 
(10) and (11) in section 4.1 as an equilibrium, the beliefs μ
 H
 t must be such that, at each time 
t<F, the bank will find it optimal to charge R H,t . We know that this will indeed be the case 
only if, at each time t, the bank still believes that there is a sufficiently high chance that the 
firm is high-risk (even in case the history of the game is such that the firm has always 
rejected all previous offers).  To parallel the inequality in Equation (A4), we need to require 
that the bank’s time t posterior probability that the firm is high-risk (μ t ) be higher than the 




 t ≥ μ*t     for  all  t<F    (A5) 
  
Similar to (A4), the threshold value μ*t can be inferred as the posterior belief that makes the 
bank indifferent at time t between lending at R H  only in the event that the firm is high risk 
and lending at R L  in either case, i.e. whichever the firm’s risk level. 
                                                      
29 The bank knows that, by raising the interest rate charged, it will attract only risky borrowers and low risk 
firms will be credit-rationed. However, unlike the classic credit-rationing equilibrium in Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981), in this model when the proportion of risky firms is sufficiently high (μ
H > μ*), the prospect of lending a 
large dollar amount at a high interest rate R
H more than offsets the bank’s concern for taking on a higher risk. 
By contrast, if the bank were to charge R
L it would still attract also high-risk types, only that the interest rate 
charged would now be insufficient to ensure an adequate risk-adjusted return to cover the cost of funding high-
risk firms.  
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To illustrate further the above restriction on beliefs, we focus on the case where the bank sees 
its offer at time  t-1 rejected by the firm ( i.e. x t-1 = 0 ). With what (posterior) probability will 
















































     ( A 6 )  
 











































  for all t<F    (A7) 
 
The bank will want to maximize the probability that at each time t the high-risk firm will 
reveal her type. In other words, in the bank’s preferred equilibrium, the constraint on beliefs 
(A7) will bind and the sequence of equilibrium beliefs {μ
H
t} can be determined by applying 





What will be the interest rate the bank will charge to induce separation at time F in 
equilibrium ? It is easy to verify that the bank will not be able to induce full separation by 
offering rF = RH  . This is because, faced with such an offer at time F, a high-risk firm will be 
better off  “pretending” to be low risk. In fact, if she rejects it, the bank will conclude that she 
has revealed to be low-risk and the firm will therefore enjoy low interest rate offers at RL ever 
after. 
More precisely, in order to induce truthful revelation, the following incentive compatibility 
constraint needs to hold at time F: 
 





t L t H
H
t F F H R R r R
1
, , , δ       ( A 8 )  
 
The right-hand side represents the time-F value of all the rents that a high-risk firm would 
enjoy for all remaining periods after F, if she “pretends” to be low risk. The left-hand side 
reflects the ‘carrot’ that the bank needs to offer in order to induce a high-risk firm to 
truthfully reveal her type at time F. Solving for rF , (A8) gives: 
 














1δ        ( A 9 )  
 
It is easy to verify that R* < RH .  On the other hand, the lower bound on rF  will naturally be 
RL. In fact, if the bank charges anything lower than that, then it will not be able to achieve 
any separation, because in that case a low-risk firm will also accept (“take the money and 
run”). Optimally the bank will charge in equilibrium the highest rF  such that (A9) holds, i.e. 




 R* > RL .          ( A 1 0 )  
 










t δ          ( A 1 1 )  
 
ie. separation is possible provided that discount factors for high-risk firms are sufficiently low 
(or equivalently their risk level q
H sufficiently high).    
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 Registry Cov. 
GDP  
Growth Inflation 
Argentina 11  48.3  49.8  15.3  2.0  4.7 
Australia 11  32.4  74.3  0.0  2.9  2.6 
Austria 11  51.4  31.5  0.8  1.9  1.8 
Belgium 11  44.6  53.3  11.0  2.2  1.8 
Brazil 11  47.7  43.7  3.4  3.1  44.8 
Canada 11  30.8  82.4  0.0  3.4  2.0 
Chile 11  38.8  22.6  21.5  4.8  4.4 
China 11  69.9  0.0  0.1  9.0  3.9 
Czech Republic  6  51.7  14.6  0.3  2.6  5.3 
Denmark 11  41.2  5.9  0.0  2.0  2.2 
Finland 11  31.7  10.1  0.0  3.4  1.4 
France 11  46.3  0.0  1.2  2.2  1.6 
Germany 11  45.2  70.8  0.4  1.3  1.5 
Greece 11  60.6  8.8  0.0  3.0  5.2 
Hong Kong, China  11  56.9  23.8  0.0  3.8  1.2 
Hungary 7  59.3  1.2  0.0  3.5  12.8 
India 11  38.8  0.0  0.0  5.0  6.3 
Indonesia 11  52.1  0.0  0.2  3.3  13.6 
Ireland 11  34.6  75.5  0.0  6.4  3.0 
Israel 11  45.9  0.7  0.0  1.3  5.6 
Italy 11  52.9  43.0  5.6  1.7  2.7 
Japan 11  56.0  76.2  0.0  1.3  0.0 
Korea, Rep.  11  56.5  80.7  0.0  5.6  3.9 
Luxembourg 1  33.9  50.0  0.0  3.5  1.9 
Malaysia 11  61.8  46.1  12.6  5.6  2.5 
Mexico 11  36.4  34.7  0.0  2.9  14.6 
Netherlands 11  40.9  54.0  0.0  2.3  2.3 
New Zealand  11  27.5  83.3  0.0  2.3  2.1 
Norway 11  25.4  94.9  0.0  2.6  2.1 
Pakistan 11  54.1  0.3  0.0  1.3  7.1 
Peru 7  51.8  14.2  9.6  4.2  5.7 
Philippines 11  49.3  0.9  0.0  4.0  6.1 
Poland 5  59.1  38.0  0.0  4.3  10.7 
Portugal 11  44.5  2.9  50.9  1.9  3.3 
Russia 6  53.3  0.0  0.0  2.2  48.9 
Singapore 11  55.3  49.6  0.0  5.3  1.1 
South Africa  11  48.0  48.4  0.0  3.1  6.4 
Spain 11  46.9  5.0  31.3  2.5  3.2 
Sweden 11  31.2  53.4  0.0  2.9  1.2 
Switzerland 11  34.6  18.3  0.0  1.3  0.8 
Taiwan, China  11  57.6  3.5  0.0  4.8  1.3 
Thailand 11  54.1  10.2  0.0  3.3  3.4 
Turkey 11  61.0  19.3  0.4  4.0  60.8 
United Kingdom  11  42.5  68.4  0.0  2.9  2.7 
United States  11  21.6  82.7  0.0  3.4  2.5 
Average 10.2  46.1  33.3  3.7  3.2  7.9  
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Figure A1: Short-term debt and country risk 
 
This figure presents the average short-term debt to total debt ratios (STD/TD) of firms in each country for the 















































































































































Figure A2: Short-term debt and microeconomic risk 
 
This figure presents the average short-term debt to total debt ratios (STD/TD) of firms in each country for the 
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